But, of course, this has a flip side: if your home currency suddenly loses value against the currency that your loan is denominated in, your payments suddenly increase. This is exactly what happened when the global crisis started: currency traders started selling Eastern European currencies in a panic, and lots of borrowers in those countries saw their monthly loan payments soar by as much as 50%. A lot of them defaulted (about 6-7%). Countries in which the share of foreign currency loans in their total credit market was the largest (such as Latvia with 90%, Hungary with 63% or Romania with about 60%) had to request assistance from the IMF to cope with the crash.
My question is: in the pre-crisis period, why were banks so excessively enthusiastic about giving out those loans? They must have known that a sudden large devaluing of local currencies would cause a huge wave of defaults. Were they simply counting on the fact that, if push came to shove, their debtors would be bailed out by the IMF and/or the EU? Take, for example, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Latvia. Their total domestic credit is $258 billion, $89 billion, $73 billion, and $29 billion, respectively; and the share of foreign currency loans in that is 35%, 63%, 60% and 90%. So the total amount of foreign currency loans is about $220 billion (and that's rounding way up, too). So assuming all those credit markets crash all at once with a catastrophic default rate of 10%, we'd see a hole of about $22 billion. That's not a lot of money, and it's a fair assumption to expect the IMF or ECB to step in and cover that.
Still, some of the banks operating in those countries have denominated close to 100% of their loans in non-local currencies. I don't really know much about finance; but does this sound like good risk management?
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